The project examines what it is that makes food business operators in the German poultry indus-tries (feed industry, primary production, slaughtering, processing and distribution) break (or not break) rules. It aims at contributing to improved consumer protection by using this knowledge for conclusions regarding the design of adequate prevention measures.

We use an interdisciplinary approach which combines the knowledge of food technologists with the analytical powers of microeconomics (game theory and incentive analysis) and criminology (control theories and protective factor analysis). The common conception of economists and criminologists is that purposive action, in conjunction with the individual s social context factors are responsible for his behaviour. However, economists and criminologists focus on different aspects of the actors attributes and decision frameworks. That is why we combine the microeco-nomic and the criminological analysts perspectives and toolboxes. Synthesising the disciplinary results facilitates the early identification of critical points according to the behavioural rationale that offences are imminent if they are both technologically viable and if (significant) misdirected economic incentives coincide with missing protective factors.

Step A involves a positive analysis of the economic and social determinants of human behaviour in the two poultry chains under consideration. We first identify practical and relevant opportuni-ties for disregarding existing regulations and contract agreements by collecting and systematising partial data stocks available at scattered places and by gathering knowledge from experts such as food scientists who are familiar with production processes and critical substances. We then collect data for the actors decision parameters such as prices, sanctions, expected controls etc. and analyse the economic incentives situation on different chain levels and for different activities by using a formal moral hazard model (PA-model). This facilitates the identification of problem spots where profit maximising food business operators are most tempted to break the rules. It allows also for a structured understanding of the decision-making situation of the different ac-tors. Additionally, the social settings and value systems of food business operators and their ef-fects on compliance with rules in the light of contrary economic temptations are investigated. This includes situations of both high and low norm internalisation. Examples of the latter may be a low acceptance of rules which are perceived to act mainly as a deterrent to competitors, or the existence of clubs whose members commonly reject the legitimacy of public authorities.

Step B involves a normative analysis from the public authorities and consumers point of view. That is, we investigate preventive measures which reduce or eliminate moral hazard in the poul-try industries. On the one hand, this refers to measures that change the economic environment in that they reduce economic temptations for malpractice by changing the underlying determinants such as intensities of control, control points, traceability, sanctions etc. Restrictions such as up-per admissible sanction levels, the costs of different control technologies, and the current food legislation (including EU regulations in force from 2006) are accounted for. On the other hand, this refers to measures that change the social environment in that they enhance protective factors by trying to influence the value system, norm acceptance and self assessment of different (groups of) actors. When making recommendations, economic and social findings are considered simul-taneously in order to derive a consistent set of complementary measures. In this context, search for consistency implies trying to avoid that progress in one field (e.g. reduction of misdirected economic incentives through increased controls) is thwarted by drawbacks in others (e.g. dys-functional effects of controls by a decrease in the social acceptance of rules). That is, we will align our respective disciplinary findings through a permanent check and feed-back process.

Step C involves the development of general guidelines for the analysis of behavioural food risks. Besides the specific poultry findings, we focus on the question which methodical conclusions can be made with regard to future fact finding activities in other food chains. While there is clearly no generally valid methodical approach, problem structures can be systematically as-sessed and broken down into categories. This facilitates a classification into problem types fea-turing common characteristics. Thus, prudent methodical generalisations can be made, laying the groundwork for a manual which gives step-by-step guidance of how to gather economic-criminological intelligence in different problem situations in the food sector in general.

HIRSCHAUER, N. (2004): A Model-Based Approach to Moral Hazard in Food Chains. What Contribution Do Principal-Agent-Models Make to the Understanding of Food Risks Induced by Opportunistic Behaviour? Agrarwirtschaft - German Journal of Agricultural Economics 53(5): 192-205.

HIRSCHAUER, N., MUßHOFF, O. (2004): Why complete traceability is not enough to confide: Farmers incentives for fungicide fraud. In: Hofstede, G.J., Spaans, L., Schepers, H., Trienekens, J., Beulens, A. (eds): Hide or confide: the dilemma of transparency: 41 49, Gravenhage, Netherlands.

HIRSCHAUER, N., SCHEERER, S. (2005): The Prevention of White-collar Crime in the Food Sector. An Interdisciplinary Applied Research Approach. In: Kerner, H.-J., Marks, E. (Hrsg.): Internetdokumentation Deutscher Präventionstag. Hannover.
http://www.praeventionstag.de/content/10_praev/doku/hirschauerscheerer/index_10_hirschauerscheerer.html

HIRSCHAUER, N., MUßHOFF, O. (2005): The Consequences of Heterogeneous Agents and Moral Hazard on Food Safety and Trade. In: Proceedings 92. EAAE Seminar Quality Management and Quality Assurance in Food Chains in Göt-tingen vom 2. bis 4. März 2005 (im Druck).

ZWOLL, S., HIRSCHAUER, N. (2006): Preliminary results of an interdisciplinary approach to trust and deviance in the German poultry chains. EAAE Seminar Trust and Risk in Business Networks in Bonn vom 8. bis 10. Februar 2006 (forthcoming).