Conference "Saying What We Believe. On the Linguistic Expression of Intentional Mental States" July 22 and 23, 2010 in Berlin


The aim of the planned conference is to discuss the phenomenon of the linguistic expression of intentional mental states, in particular of beliefs and intentions, against the background of two philosophical debates, each of which is closely related to one of the two aforementioned reasons for the internal connection between intentional states and their linguistic expression. The first debate is about the so-called authority of the first person and deals with the question of how to explain the special authority that people have with regard to their statements about their own mental states. The second debate revolves around the programme of the intentionalist theory of meaning first advocated by Paul Grice and thus around the question of how close the connection is between linguistic meaning on the one hand and the expression of convictions and intentions on the other. Both debates have interesting points of overlap and their results are mutually relevant to each other. The basic idea of the conference is therefore to bring together and discuss with each other some philosophers who have contributed significantly to (at least) one of these two debates. In the following, we will briefly outline the role of the phenomenon of linguistic expression of intentional states for both debates, the questions it raises and how they are related to each other.


Principal Investigators
Rosefeldt, Tobias Prof. Dr. (Details) (Classical German Philosophy)

Duration of Project
Start date: 06/2010
End date: 09/2010

Last updated on 2020-11-03 at 23:09