Delegation of Power to International Organizations: Agency Losses, Unintended Consequences, and Authority Shift
There has been considerable debate about delegation of power to International Organizations (IOs), but few studies compare different types of IOs and explore the question of why agency losses occur over time and to what extent are principals able to detect and remedy agency losses. In addition, principal-agent approaches because they neglect the temporal dimension do not account for unintended consequences to explain agency losses. Drawing on the principal-agent approach and on the historical institutionalism, the main purpose of this research project is to conceptualize agency losses over time based on a comparison of the EU and the WTO.
Financer
Duration of project
Start date: 01/2010
End date: 12/2012
Publications
da Conceição-Heldt, E. (2011): Variation in EU Member States Preferences and the Commission s Discretion in the Doha Round, Journal of European Public Policy, 18 (3), forthcoming. da Conceição-Heldt, E. (2011): Who Controls Whom? Dynamics of Power Delegation and Agency Losses in EU Trade Politics, Journal of Common Market Studies, forthcoming. da Conceição-Heldt, E. (2010): The Commission-as-Agent at the Interface between Internal EU Decision-Making and External WTO Negotiations: An Analysis of Tactical Opportunities and Agency Losses, Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention in New Orleans, Panel Demystifying the Agent in International Trade Negotiations, 17-21 February 2010.
