EXC 264/2: Reception and Critique of Materialist Body-Soul Theories in the Middle Ages and the Early Modern Period (SP D-2-4)


Most medieval and early modern philosophers took it for granted that the human soul has numerous faculties that enable it to produce a large variety of activities. Thus, thanks to the intellect it can produce acts of thinking, and thanks to the will it can bring about acts of willing. But what are the intellect, the will and other faculties? How are they related to the soul? Where are they located? And how can they be activated in a given situation?

The project examined these questions by looking at a large number of Aristotelian and anti-Aristotelian texts, ranging from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century. It pays particular attention to the metaphysical problems that were at stake, for theories of faculties were always part of general theories of the soul. While Aristotelian authors claimed that it was impossible to give an account of faculties without referring to souls as substantial forms, anti-Aristotelians rejected every appeal to forms. And while many Aristotelians thought that faculties could be described as real things acting inside a human being, anti-Aristotelians denied that there was a network of inner agents. Moreover, there was a controversy about the way faculties should be related to the body. Some philosophers claimed that all the faculties should be assigned to specific parts of the body, while others took some faculties – paradigmatically intellect and will – to be independent of the body. This gave rise to a heated debate about the materiality or immateriality of faculties.

Principal investigators
Perler, Dominik Prof. Dr. (Details) (Theoretical Philosophy)

Financer
DFG Excellence Initiative Cluster

Duration of project
Start date: 11/2012
End date: 10/2017

Subproject of

Research Areas
Ancient Cultures

Last updated on 2025-16-01 at 14:08