Imagination and counterfactual knowledge

In the coming three years, we will continue to investigate the central question that has guided the first phase of the project: How can we have knowledge of what is not actually, but merely possibly the case. And, relatedly, how could we ever justify our assumptions about what would happen if some other particular situation obtained? In the first project phase, we showed that a systematic answer to this question requires assigning an important role to the imagination – a quasi-perceptual representation of possible scenarios – in the acquisition of modal knowledge. However, there is currently no plausible theory of the imagination which explains this role for modal knowledge. We will fill this gap in the second phase of the project. First, we will investigate which forms of the imagination exist and how they differ from each other and related mental states. We will also look at the relationship between the imagination and scientific practices such as computer-aided visual simulations. Next, we will look at the ways in which cognitively valuable forms of the imagination differ from those types of creative simulation which lack immediate cognitive benefits. Our working hypothesis is that imagination can only lead to knowledge if it doesn't proceed lawlessly but is instead restricted by particular mechanisms. However, it is unclear precisely how this restriction functions for different forms of modal knowledge and what cognitive faculty produces it. Both questions deserve further investigation. Part of our investigation will concern one prominent conception of the imagination in the history of philosophy, namely Kant's theory of the ‚Einbildungskraft’. We will show the systematic potential of Kant's conception for the contemporary discussion of the cognitive value of the imagination.