A game-theoretic and institutional analysis of moral hazards and social dilemmas: the case of behavioural food risks and white-collar crime in agri-food chains

Malpractice in production entails unacceptable technological procedures and increased risks of adverse outcomes for trading partners and the society. Despite their physical implications, behavioural risk sources in economic relationships are known as moral hazards. They can be seen as social dilemmas originating from negative externalities caused by the breaking of rules designed to prevent them. The probability of malpractice increases with misdirected economic incentives, i.e. the expected profit it is able to produce. It decreases with bonds to norms that prevent producers from giving way to economic temptations.



Despite a growing societal awareness, little research has been done on the conditions of rule-abiding and rule-breaking behaviour in food production contexts characterised by asymmetric information and conflicting interests. Consequently, large knowledge gaps persist on decision-making processes and on identifying and curbing behavioural food risks. The project aims to assess how a microeconomic empirical analysis of the actors incentives can be combined with an analysis of institutional environments, thus contributing to the understanding of decision-making in food businesses and of the making and changing of institutional environments.


Principal Investigators
Hirschauer, Norbert Dr. agr. (Details) (Agricultural Farm Management)

Financer
DFG: Sachbeihilfe

Duration of Project
Start date: 03/2007
End date: 05/2008

Last updated on 2020-09-03 at 23:21